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In my 2016 paper “Should Deceased Donation be Morally Preferred in Uterus Transplantation 
Trials?” I explored a number of the ethical concerns and questions posed by the use of living 
donors in uterus transplantation trials, and asked whether there might, as a result, exist 
compelling moral reasons for teams conducting UTx research to prefer the use of uteri from 
deceased donors. After consideration of a number of factors such as the harms associated 
with living donation, the possibility of donor regret, and the potential for serious threats to 
donor autonomy and consent, I suggested that all things being equal a deceased donor model 
should be preferred for uterus transplantation. All things, however, were not equal and I 
therefore suggested that at that moment in time - given uncertainties regarding the likelihood 
of success associated with each donor model and questions regarding the availability of 
deceased donor uteri - the use of uteri from both living and deceased donors could be justified 
provided that certain background conditions were met (Williams, 2016).  
 
Two years of research into UTx later and consensus is not forthcoming among physicians and 
commentators regarding either questions of demand or the relative efficiency of each donor 
model. As such, it is expected that for the foreseeable future both donor models will be 
utilised by those pursuing UTx research. Given this, work like Bruno and Arora’s, which 
highlights how the ethical terrain surrounding uterus transplantation changes depending on 
the donor model used, and proposes regulatory responses to protect the interests of the 
various parties holding stakes in UTx, is to be welcomed as a valuable addition to the existing 
UTx literature. Indeed, the breadth of topics covered in the article makes this paper especially 
useful for physicians and policy makers currently conducting UTx research. Such topics 
include whether and when the use of living donors can be justified in UTx trials; concerns 
regarding respect for the autonomy of both living and deceased donors; the proper 
expectations of donors (and donor families) regarding ‘access’ to children born through UTx; 
allocation criteria for recipients of non-directed donated uteri; and how to track outcomes 
for donors and recipients of uterus transplants effectively moving forward.  
 
However, while there is much to like in Bruno and Arora’s paper, there are points at which a 
number of questionable positions and prescriptions are forwarded without sufficient 
elaboration or justification. Of particular interest to this author, however – given research I 
am currently conducting on the retrieval of composite tissues from deceased donors for 
Vascularised Composite Allografts (VCA’s) – is the remarkably strict position Bruno and Arora 
take regarding appropriate consent to deceased uterus donation within their paper (Bruno & 
Arora, 2018, 7-9) In what follows I therefore offer a number of brief comments on this position 
and the discussion that precedes it. 
 
In 1995, the British National Health Service’s (NHS) introduction of an organ donor register 
allowed individuals the opportunity to record their donation preferences on a single 
database, a significant improvement on the previous system which relied only on an 
individual’s possession of a donor card and testimony from an appointed representative as to 
their preferences (NHS, 2015). Like the donor card which originally included only kidneys and 
was later expanded to include the heart, liver, pancreas, and corneas, the range of organs and 
tissues included in the register have been expanded over time. Those who now sign the 
register and opt to donate all of their organs and tissues therefore express a willingness to 
donate a greater variety of organs and tissues than was the case even ten years ago. Despite 
this, however, a blanket consent provided for post-humous donation ten years ago is treated 
in the same way as blanket consent today even though those who have previously signed the 
register may not have considered donating certain tissues or been made aware of changes 
made to the register. Thus, questions can be raised regarding whether or not transplant 
physicians may be considered justified in retrieving such tissues from the recently deceased.  
 
UTx has not yet been included on organ donation registers in either the UK or the US. 
Therefore similar questions can and have been raised regarding whether potential organ and 
tissue donors are aware that uterus donation is even an option and indeed, whether they may 
prove less willing to donate ‘novel’, ‘experimental’, ‘non-vital’, ‘visible’, and, indeed, 
‘controversial’ organs and tissues after their death than they would be donate more common 
organs and tissues (Caplan et al, 2007; Williams, 2016, Woessner et al 2015).  Given this, if we 
are minded to both respect the preferences of would-be organ donors, and preserve public 
trust in medicine by avoiding scandals such as that which occurred in the UK at Alder Hey in 
the 1990s, such authors suggest that it would be inappropriate to presume consent to uterus 
donation on the basis of an individual’s recorded desire to donate ‘any/all organs and tissues’ 
on an organ donation register. Indeed, similar sentiments have been expressed with respect 
to face transplantation (Freeman & Jaoudé, 2006, 79-80) and other VCA’s and both US 
OPTN/UNOS policy and NHS Policy in Wales reflect this concern by requiring that separate 
and specific authorisation be provided for VCA donation by either the donor themselves prior 
to death or their designed surrogate/proxy (OPTN, 2017; NHSBT, 2013). 
 
That individuals often hold complex preferences regarding organ donation is easily illustrated 
by reference to the UK’s NHS Transplant Activity Report. For, although the 2017 report shows 
that 88% of registered donors are willing to donate all organs and tissues posthumously, a 
significant minority of 12% exhibit more complex preferences with 90% of that minority 
proving unwilling to donate their corneas and over 20% refusing to donate pancreases, hearts 
and lungs (NHS, 2017). Yet, despite a lack of awareness regarding VCA donation it is also 
important not to presume that willingness to donate VCA’s  post-mortem is likely to be far 
lower than in cases of other ‘more common’ organs and tissues. Indeed, a 2014 survey looking 
to preferences and rationales for organ donation among 1027 individuals in New Jersey 
showed that although respondents were more willing to donate solid organs than VCA’s, the 
percentage willing to donate for some or all VCA’s was far higher than might have been 
assumed. For, of the 69.7% of respondents willing to donate upon death were also happy to 
donate for some or all VCA’s. In the case of uterus donation this amounted to 60% of female 
respondents, a percentage not much lower than the 65% willing to donate their cornea’s and 
higher than those willing to donate hands (54.6%) and faces (44%) (Sarwer et al, 2014, p. 26).  
 
Yet, while it seems reasonable to hold that separate consent for VCA donation should 
currently be required in the context of UTx, Bruno and Arora make a further claim that I 
suggest is both mistaken and mysterious and would serve to unnecessarily limit the pool of 
potential deceased uterus donors. I refer here to  their claim, following Woessner et al (2015), 
that surrogate or proxy consent is currently inappropriate for deceased uterus donation and 
thus that uteri should only be retrieved from donors who have expressed a desire to donate 
whilst  living (Bruno and Arora, 2018, 9 & 23). In making this claim, and justifying it by appeal 
to a lack of evidence regarding “public attitudes toward uterus transplantation, and donor’s 
views of uterus donation” Bruno and Arora take a remarkably narrow view of the role that 
surrogate decision makers should play in post-mortem organ donation decision-making. For, 
they seem to view the surrogate’s role as encompassing little more than the job of ‘reporting’ 
the donation preferences of the recently deceased.  
 
In cases where a decedent has competently, completely, and clearly expressed their 
preferences either formally or informally regarding post-mortem organ donation prior to 
their deaths this should indeed be the primary role of surrogates, especially in highly 
individualist societies such as the USA. However, in many cases, the role played by surrogates 
is complicated by a number of factors. Foremost amongst these, for the purpose of this 
commentary is that surrogates are often in possession of incomplete information regarding 
the decedent’s donation preferences. This may, for example, be because the donor has never 
considered donation and thus lacks any interests either in or against its performance, because 
the donor has failed to reveal their preferences to others, or, as is the case here, because 
(whether or not a donor card has been signed) consent is sought for an uncommon purpose 
or novel form of transplant. 
 
In the former cases, however, it is not generally held that a designated surrogate will not be 
able to reach a decision as to whether donation should proceed. Instead, in such cases the 
surrogate’s role extends beyond mere reporting, and into the realm of substituted 
judgement. Here, the surrogate attempts (albeit necessarily imperfectly) – using their 
knowledge of the potential donor’s personality, previous actions, and interests – to  ‘don the 
mental mantle’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994, p. 171) of the decedent and make a decision 
regarding whether or not they would have desired to donate. Individual preferences 
regarding organ donation do not arise ex nihilo, but from a particular psychology and set of 
beliefs. Thus, if it is deemed possible and appropriate for surrogates to make donation 
decisions on the behalf of the deceased in other circumstances why then, should the same 
approach not extend to surrogate decision making in the case of UTx?  
 
It may, perhaps, at least in certain cases, be harder for a surrogate to make a decision 
regarding uterus donation than to make a decision regarding the donation of more common 
organs and tissues. In such cases the surrogate should arguably err on the side of caution 
especially if one believes that to fail to remove organs/tissues from willing donors is a less 
grievous act than removing them from those who are unwilling. It is, however, no less possible 
for a surrogate to determine a decedent’s preferences than in other donation contexts. Thus, 
if a surrogate should be confident to determine a would-be solid organ donor’s preferences 
from his knowledge of the donor, surrogates of known anti-natalists may feel similarly secure 
in their belief that the deceased would likely have objected to uterus donation and surrogates 
of those who expressed a lack of concern for their bodies after their death may just as  safely 
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